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The theory of social capital suggests that trust in other individuals 
(social trust) and trust in institutions are closely related phenomena. 
People who trust more in other individuals also trust more in 
institutions, and vice versa. Some scholars argue that trust 
generates a climate of social cooperation and a sense of 
collaboration, which in turn promotes interest and participation in 
institutions. Despite the fact that both social trust and trust in 
institutions tend to decline when socioeconomic conditions worsen, 
the theory of social capital rarely takes economic variables into 
account. The economic crisis in Spain resulted in a paradox: a 
notable decline in trust in institutions, together with a surprising 
increase – rather than the expected decrease – in social trust. In 
this article we analyse the impact of a number of variables on social 
trust and trust in institutions before and during the economic crisis 
in Spain. The results confirm that economic factors had greater 
explanatory power for both types of trust during times of economic 
crisis, due mainly to increased inequality. However, the classic 
variables of the theory of social capital, such as how people view 
democracy or the extent of civic participation, continued to be 
significant. The data analysed here also highlight the possibility that 
the two types of trust did not track in a mutually supportive manner 
due to the emergence of the Movimiento 15M (“15M Movement”), 
which gave rise to the appearance of new political parties such as 
Podemos (“We Can”), on the extreme left of the electoral scale. 
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The effects of economic crisis on trust  
 
The economic crisis had a more socioeconomically significant impact in Spain 
than in the majority of European Union (EU) countries. Spain’s GDP per capita 
declined in line with other EU countries during the crisis: in 2006, GDP stood 
above the average for EU countries (105%), but by 2013 it was already below the 
average, at 95% (EUROSTAT, 2015). Public debt, which in 2007 stood at 36.1% 
of GDP, rose to 93.4% by 2013 (Bank of Spain, 2013). The impact of the crisis 
on labour markets was devastating. Unemployment, from 7.95% of the active 
population in 2007, reached the historical high of 27.16% in 2013, with youth 
unemployment (unemployed individuals aged less than 25 years) reaching 57.2% 
according to the national Labour Force Survey (2013). Such figures paint a 
picture of general deterioration in quality of life, corroborated by the fact that 
average household income in Spain fell from 29,634 euros per year in 2009 to 
26,174 euros per year in 2013, according to the national Quality of Life Survey 
(Spanish Statistical Office, 2015). In addition, poverty and social exclusion 
increased at an alarming rate from the beginning of the crisis. In 2014, 29.2% of 
the Spanish population found itself at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 2.3 
million people more than in 2008 and exceeding the EU15 average by more than 
6 percentage points (Intermon-Oxfam, 2016). 
 
The economic crisis had three key effects at social and political levels: 1) a rapid 
increase in income inequalities given that the crisis affected the rich and the poor 
in very different ways; 2) the emergence of the 15M Movement (Movimiento 15M) 
in 2001, which gave rise to new political parties that identified as more left-leaning 
than traditional parties, with the most notable case being the We Can (Podemos) 
party, founded in 2014; and 3) a collapse in trust in institutions among Spanish 
citizens together with a surprising increase in social trust. 
 
The rapid rise in income disparities in Spain during the crisis was particularly 
significant. Discounting Cyprus, of all OECD countries Spain saw the greatest 
increase in inequality as a result of the crisis: an increase almost 10 times greater 
than the European average, and 14 times more than increases in Greece 
(Intermon-Oxfam, 2016). Although the crisis affected the entire Spanish 
population, it did not do so equally, with the poorest losing significantly more than 
the richest. Between 2008 and 2011, the poorest 10% of society saw their annual 
incomes decrease by 42.4%, while the richest 10% saw a decrease of just 5.6% 
in the same period. With this, Spain became the second-most economically 
unequal country in the EU, exceeded only by the United Kingdom, according to 
the Income Inequality Update (OECD, 2014).  
 
The economic crisis in Spain also gave rise to public protests between 2011 and 
2015. These protests became known as the 15M Movement (Movimiento 15M), 
or the movement of the Indignados (known in many international spheres as the 
“Spanish Revolution”). The protests gave voice to a wide range of political, 
economic and social claims that reflected the desire of participants for profound 
changes in the prevailing democratic and economic model of the time. From this 
social mobilization emerged new political parties that leaned further to the left of 
traditional parties. The most significant of these was We Can (Podemos), which 
was established in January 2014 and participated in the European elections of 
the same year, securing five Eurodeputies and becoming the fourth most voted 
for group.   
Yet perhaps the most surprising effect of the 2008 crisis was that Spanish 
citizens’ trust in democratic institutions decreased notably, while social trust, 
understood as trust in other individuals, not only did not decrease, but in fact 
increased. Table 1 compares social trust and trust in institutions among Spanish 
citizens in 2004, a year in which GDP growth in Spain was significant due to 
growth in the real estate sector and the mass arrival of immigrant workers in the 
construction and services sectors, and in 2012, during full economic crisis. The 
data show that the percentage of people not trusting in Parliament doubled 
between 2004 and 2012, growing from almost 30% to more than 60%. Trust in 
political parties was already very low in 2004, with more than 57% of people 
stating that they mistrusted political parties, but during the crisis it collapsed: 
almost 85% said they mistrusted political parties and only 7% stated that they 
trusted them. Citizens also lost trust in the legal system: before the crisis, 40% of 
people mistrusted the legal system, with this number rising to almost 60% during 
the crisis. The only institution that saw continued trust from citizens was the 
police. These changes coincided with harsh governmental economic adjustments 
and a rapid increase in poverty and inequality. Yet the clear collapse in trust in 
institutions was not mirrored by a collapse in social trust. Rather, social trust 
during the crisis increased by almost five percentage points: from nearly 40%, the 
number of people stating that they trusted others rose to around 45%. 
 
 
In theoretical terms, it is no surprise that the economic crisis led to decreases in 
trust in democratic institutions (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; Nannestad 2008; 
Zmerli and Castillo, 2015). However, what is surprising is that this decrease was 
not accompanied by a decrease in social trust. Although social trust and trust in 
institutions are distinct variables, they are frequently considered to feed into each 
other, and to be mutually supportive (Gambetta, 1988; Putnam, 1993, 2000; 
Inglehart, 1997; Brehm and Rhan, 1997; Stompka, 2000; Newton and Norris, 
2000; Dekker and Uslaner, 2001; Zmerli and Newton, 2008; Rothstein, 2011). In 
this study we seek to analyse how the two variables behaved in a context of 
economic recession. To date, explanations of social trust and trust in institutions 
have focused more on questions of civic participation (Putnam, 1993, 2000), on 
satisfaction with democracy (Zmerli and Newton, 2008), and on the presence of 
a critical citizenry (Norris, 1999, 2011), than on the economy. Our hypothesis, 
however, is that in moments of economic crisis, the relationship between the two 
types of trust is not mutually supportive for two key reasons. The first refers to the 
fact that economic polarisation profoundly changes the basis of social trust and 
trust in institutions. The second refers to the social response to the emergence of 
new leftist social and political movements that are highly critical of institutions, but 
that trust in the capacities of society. 
 
Using data for Spain from the European Social Survey, we conduct structural 
equation modelling with five dependent variables. One of these variables is trust 
between individuals (social trust). To facilitate observations of differential effects, 
the other four variables are four different forms of trust in institutions: trust in 
Parliament, trust in political parties, trust in the legal system, and trust in the 
police. The model involves testing the effects of five economic variables: a 
person’s satisfaction with the economy; whether they have economic difficulties 
or not; their principal source of income; the type of employment contract they 
hold; and whether or not they are unemployed. We compare these effects with 
the effects of three variables which, at the theoretical level, are considered to 
influence levels of trust: 1) satisfaction with democracy, 2) civic participation 
(whether a person has been part of a civic association in the past 12 months), 
and 3) self-positioning on the political spectrum (from one to 10, from left to right). 
We control for the effect of other socioeconomic variables. The model is 
replicated at two specific points in time: before the crisis (2004) and during the 






Interpersonal exchanges and reciprocity are basic elements of social life and 
human behaviour. The very notion of society is inseparable from these, and from 
all types of relationships among people. However, in order to function, human 
relationships require a minimal level of trust. Social trust offers the cohesiveness 
necessary for producing meaningful social relationships. There is a consensus 
among scholars that trust is a necessary condition for a healthy economy, society 
and political life (Hardin, 2002). However, there are a number of nuances in 
defining trust. Social trust can be defined as a belief that others will not cause 
one harm in a deliberate or conscious manner, if they can avoid it, and that they 
will consider one’s interests as far as possible (Delhey and Newton, 2005). The 
assumption here is that people choose how they behave. Conversely, Luhmann 
(1979) conceives trust simply as a mechanism for reducing uncertainty and the 
complexity of the world today. For Yamagishi (2001), trust is a form of social 
intelligence that is contingent on people having mutual interests and certain 
characteristics.  
 
Social trust is distinct from trust in institutions (Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002). 
Newton (1999) argues that social trust belongs to the private sphere and that it is 
a characteristic of personal relationships based on first hand experiences and 
knowledge. Conversely, trust in institutions belongs to the public and political 
spheres and it is established based on secondary sources, particularly mass 
communication media. According to Levi and Stoker (2000), trust in institutions 
depends on individuals’ positive evaluations of the most relevant attributes 
making each institution worthy of trust, such as credibility, justice, competence, 
transparency and openness to different points of view. The quality of institutions 
and their operation affects levels of trust (Rothstein, 2011). Existing research, 
known as performance theories, propose that citizens’ trust in institutions 
depends on their perceptions of how those institutions are performing. Lipset and 
Schneider (1987) highlight that levels of trust in institutions are primarily linked to 
the effect that institutional action has on the economic wellbeing of citizens. Other 
authors, such as Kramer (1983), posit that the successes and prestige of the 
State are also central in determining the level of trust that people have in 
democratic institutions. Newton and Norris (2000) equate trust in institutions and 
political trust given that they consider trust in institutions to be the key indicator 
of citizens’ fundamental views of the political system. According to Montero, 
Zmerli and Newton (2008), political trust in an institution entails a belief that the 
institution will not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner that would be 
damaging for the interests of the people or the country, but that it will treat all 
citizens in an equal, fair and correct manner. 
 
Although social trust and trust in institutions are two distinct concepts, in line with 
the theory of social capital, they tend to be viewed as related and as feeding into 
each other (Gambetta, 1988; Putnam, 1992, 2000; Inglehart, 1997; Brehm and 
Rhan, 1997; Stompka, 2000; Newton and Norris, 2000; Dekker and Uslaner, 
2001; Zmerli and Newton, 2008; Rothstein, 2011). As Zmerli and Newton (2008) 
explain, social trust facilitates cooperation and reinforces behaviours that are 
beneficial to the general public interest. Trust between individuals promotes 
tolerance and empathy, increases interactions, and favours voluntary work and 
participation in associations (Hearn, 1997). In organizations, trust promotes a 
climate of cooperation, job satisfaction and increased productivity (Fukuyama 
1995). In this sense, trust helps to build the institutional bases of civil society, 
upon which a stable, peaceful and efficient democracy can function. Zmerli and 
Newton (2008) also argue that democracy and good governance, in turn, 
reinforce the conditions that allow social trust and trust in institutions to develop, 
leading citizens to cooperate effectively both in the private and public spheres. 
 
This relationship between social trust and trust in institutions is generally 
accepted at the theoretical level. However, in cases where empirical evidence is 
sought, the relationship appears more ambiguous. Although numerous studies 
demonstrate the existence of a clear and positive relationship between social 
trust and trust in institutions (Brehm and Rhan, 1997; Jagodzinski and Manabe, 
2004; Zmerli and Newton, 2008), others suggest that the correlation between the 
two is weak (Newton, 1999; Newton and Norris, 2000, Uslaner, 2002; Mishler and 
Rose, 2005). 
 
Within the theory of social capital, trust is more often explained using variables 
such as levels of civic participation, satisfaction with democracy, or a more 
pronounced critical citizenry, and less through economic variables. Some 
scholars posit that the existence of mature civil societies is a reflexion of, but also 
a condition for, the blossoming of social trust. Putnam (1993) points out that 
people learn civic virtues and learn to trust in the framework of their relationships, 
and particularly their voluntary relationships. Reciprocal exchanges produce 
greater trust and emotional attachment when they are spontaneous than when 
they are negotiated (Molm, Takahashi and Peterson, 2000). People with a richer 
social network tend to have greater trust in others than people who lead more 
isolated lives. However, a person’s position in this network also matters. 
Individuals in more central positions in the network, particularly in the case of a 
dense network, express greater levels of trust than others (Buskens, 1998). 
Similarly, people who have succeeded in life tend to trust more or, at least, they 
are more inclined to due to their own personal experience (Delhey and Newton, 
2003).  
 
There is therefore an important relationship between civic participation and social 
trust, as described by Brehm and Rahn (1997). The same authors, however, also 
observe that civic participation is negatively related to trust in government (Brehm 
and Rahn, 1997). In this sense, although numerous studies agree that civic 
participation generates greater levels of social trust, the same is not necessarily 
true for trust in institutions: certain studies hold that civic participation reinforces 
trust in institutions (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Leighley, 1996) while others 
state that the relationship is not significant (Newton, 1999, 2001; Newton and 
Norris, 2000). 
 
In their 2008 study, Zmerli and Newton present robust and statistically significant 
correlations that confirm the relationship between levels of satisfaction with 
democracy and both social trust and trust in institutions. In previous work, the 
same authors argue that an individual’s satisfaction with democracy is based on 
a set of perceptions – which tend to remain stable over time – of the capacity of 
a certain political system to resolve problems deemed important by the individual. 
Furthermore, the authors stress the need to distinguish satisfaction with 
democracy from political satisfaction, which consists of citizens’ evaluations of 
the performance of authorities and their political results (Zmerli, Newton and 
Montero, 2007). Although citizens of advanced economies remain largely 
committed to democratic principles, they have gradually been losing trust in 
political institutions.  
 
Despite the fact that the theory of social capital gives more weight to the variables 
of civic participation and levels of trust in democracy than it gives to 
socioeconomic conditions in explaining trust, there is robust evidence that trust 
is associated with economic equality and equality of opportunities (Delhey and 
Newton, 2005; Nannestad, 2008; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). Countries with 
significant inequalities suffer from limited trust in their institutions (Zmerli and 
Castillo, 2015). Various authors maintain that the increasingly unequal 
distribution of incomes and wealth is responsible for a general decrease in trust 
(Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995). As inequality increases, so does the social 
distance between people, leading them to believe that they have less in common 
and, in the medium term, resulting in the development of different cultures 
(Fairbrother and Martin, 2013; Rothstein, 2011). While trust is strengthened 
among the upwardly socially mobile, the opposite is true for those with little social 
mobility (Yaojun, Savage and Warde, 2008). At a more individual level, there is 
also evidence that situations of socioeconomic difficulty, such as unemployment, 
are associated with a reduction in trust (Iravany and Dindar, 2011). 
 
Objectives, hypothesis and methodology 
 
The objective of this study is to analyse the different impacts that economic 
polarisation, generated by economic crisis, has on social trust and trust in 
institutions. In explaining levels of trust, the theory of social capital focuses more 
on social variables such as civic participation, satisfaction with democracy and 
the appearance of a critical citizenry, and less on the effect of economic variables. 
We hypothesise that, in addition to these social effects, increased economic 
polarisation in moments of economic crisis alters the foundations of social trust 
and trust in institutions. However, it is important to note that in the Spanish case, 
the emergence of leftist social and political movements that were highly critical of 
institutions but trusting of society could explain why we observe a notable 
decrease in trust in institutions together with an increase in social trust. We aim 
to investigate whether these two factors – increased economic polarisation and 
the emergence of leftist movements – that emerged from the economic crisis, 
contributed to the non-mutually supportive relationship between social trust and 
trust in institutions, contrary to the predictions of social capital theory. 
 
The objectives and hypothesis of this study require the measurement of variation 
over time in the explanatory capacity of the various factors impacting social trust 
and trust in institutions (Fairbrother and Martin, 2013). We therefore use structural 
equation modelling to analyse the ‘crisis effect’ on social trust and trust in 
institutions in an integrated manner. The effect of the crisis is estimated by 
comparing two points in time. Specifically, we compare the years 2004 (before 
the crisis) and 2013 (during the crisis). The data are drawn from the second and 
sixth editions of the European Social Survey (ESS2 and ESS6). The sample size 
is 1663 (ESS2) and 1889 (ESS6) individuals over 15 years of age. The sampling 
method used is stratified two-stage probability sampling. Fieldwork was 
conducted between September 2004 and January 2005, and between January 
and May 2013, respectively.  
 
The structural equation modelling consists of five dependent variables. The first 
is social trust, measured through the question “do you believe that you can trust 
in others?” The other four are variables that measure trust in political institutions 
(parliament, political parties, the legal system and the police). These five 
variables, measured on a scale of 0 to 10, are dichotomised with 5 as the cut-off 
point. Our explanatory variables consist of a number of variables linked to the 
economy: satisfaction with the economy, living with economic difficulties (or not), 
main source of income, and type of contract held/whether unemployed. In the 
model we control for the variables to which the theory of social capital usually 
attributes the most influence on trust: satisfaction with democracy and the level 
of civic participation, measured by asking whether someone has participated in a 
civic organisation in the previous 12 months. We also control for a third variable 
that involves placing a person’s political ideology on a scale (from left to right) in 
order to assess the effect of the Movimiento 15M’s protests and its progressive 
drift towards the creation of political parties that are more left-leaning than Spain’s 
traditional parties. Finally, we include control variables relating to some key socio-
demographic variables such as gender, age, education level, extent of religiosity, 
place of birth (Spain or overseas), and political placement on the left-right axis. 
 
In this study, we analyse five indicators of trust. Let these indicators be 𝑌𝑗
∗, 𝑗 =
1, … ,5, five random, continuous variables whose values indicate the level of trust 
in j. Our objective is to estimate the following multivariate model, consisting of five 
regression equations linked through their random error terms: 
𝑌1
∗ = 𝑥′𝛽1 + 𝜀1 
𝑌2
∗ = 𝑥′𝛽2 + 𝜀2 
𝑌3
∗ = 𝑥′𝛽3 + 𝜀3 
𝑌4
∗ = 𝑥′𝛽4 + 𝜀4 
𝑌5
∗ = 𝑥′𝛽5 + 𝜀5, 
where1𝑥 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘)
′ is the vector of explanatory variables, which in our models 
is the same for each dependent variable, although it could be different; 𝛽𝑗 =
(𝛽𝑗1 , … , 𝛽𝑗𝑘 )
′
, 𝑗 = 1, … ,5 are the parameter vectors associated with the 
explanatory variables; and 𝜀𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, … ,5 are random errors that are normally 
distributed and correlated between themselves.  
 
In practice, the level of trust 𝑌𝑗
∗ cannot be measured as a continuous variable. 
This is because individuals are asked to locate themselves on a subjective scale 
of 1 to 10, meaning that methods for estimating the parameters for the model 
defined in (1), which are based on an understanding that the distribution of the 
dependent variables is multivariate normal, are no longer optimal. In this sense, 
we opt to simplify the problem to a model with binary dependent variables based 
on whether an individual trusts or does not trust.  
 
Let 𝑌𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, … ,5, be the measured levels of trust, so that: 
 
                                               
1′ Indicates the transpose of the vector 
𝑌𝑗 = {
≥ 5 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑗
∗ > 0 
< 5 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑗
∗ ≤ 0
, 𝑗 = 1, … ,5. 
 
In addition, assuming that an individual trusts in something if they indicate a level 




= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑗
∗ > 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑗      
= 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑗
∗ ≤ 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑗
 , 𝑗 = 1, … ,5. 
 
Finally, we model the joint probability that an individual trusts in the 5 items under 
analysis. This is known as a multivariate Probit model and in this case it is 
expressed as follows:  
𝑃(𝑦1 = 1, 𝑦2 = 1, 𝑦3 = 1, 𝑦4 = 1, 𝑦5 = 1) 
= 𝑃(𝑌1
∗ > 0, 𝑌2
∗ > 0, 𝑌3
∗ > 0, 𝑌4
∗ > 0, 𝑌5
∗ > 0) 
= 𝑃(𝑥′𝛽1 + 𝜀1 > 0, 𝑥
′𝛽2 + 𝜀2 > 0, 𝑥
′𝛽3 + 𝜀3 > 0, 𝑥
′𝛽4 + 𝜀4 > 0, 𝑥
′𝛽5 + 𝜀5 > 0) 
= 𝑃(𝜀1 ≤ 𝑥
′𝛽1, 𝜀2 ≤ 𝑥
′𝛽2, 𝜀3 ≤ 𝑥
′𝛽3, 𝜀4 ≤ 𝑥







′𝛽5; 𝑅),                                     (2) 
 
where Φ5(·; 𝑅) is the function of cumulative probability of a multivariate normal 
curve (dimension 5), with a correlation matrix2 𝑅.  
 
We estimate the parameter vectors 𝛽𝑗 = (𝛽𝑗1, … , 𝛽𝑗𝑘)
′
, 𝑗 = 1, … ,5, by maximising 
the logarithm of the model’s plausibility function (2). Calculating and maximising 
the logarithm of the plausibility function is more complex than for univariate Probit 
or Logit models.  
 
                                               
2When the variables are standard normal variable, the matrix of variances and covariances are 
equivalent to the matrix of linear correlations. 
We interpret the estimated parameters ?̂?𝑗 = (?̂?𝑗1 , … , ?̂?𝑗𝑘)
′
, 𝑗 = 1, … ,5 in the same 




Table 2 shows the variation in the indicators between 2004 and 2012 according 
to different types of trust3. In analysing the data, first we look at how the crisis 
altered the influence of economic variables on social trust and trust in institutions. 
Second, we analyse the explanatory capacity of the most significant control 
variables in the two time periods.  
 
                                               
3 The estimated correlation matrix, R,̂ provides information on the dependency between levels of trust not 
captured by the explanatory variables. If these correlations were zero, the optimal result would be to 
estimate 5 univariate Probit models. However, the estimated correlations are significantly different to 
zero.  
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In today’s postmodernity or late modernity, we see increasing evidence of a so-called 
‘two-thirds society’. That is to say, one part of the population is integrated in the 
socioeconomic system and the rest are excluded from it (Lindbeck and Snower, 1989; 
Lash and Urry, 1994). Analysis of our statistical model suggests that the behaviour of 
these two societal groups – one that is part of the system and one that is increasingly 
excluded – is increasingly different in terms of social trust and trust in institutions.  
 
On the one hand, the crisis very clearly affected social trust among people with few 
economic resources. Specifically, people that suffered the most through the crisis 
stopped trusting in others. Before the crisis, people in financial diff iculty and people in 
financial comfort demonstrated similar levels of trust in other individuals, while after 
the crisis the two groups reported significantly different levels. The hypothesis that 
people who suffered the most from the crisis lost trust in others is reinforced if we 
analyse unemployment. In 2004, social trust among people that had been unemployed 
once was no different to social trust among people that had never been unemployed. 
However, this changed in 2013, when unemployed people, or those who had been 
unemployed at some point, trusted less in others. On the other hand, people who were 
satisfied with the state of the economy during the crisis – an elite of only 6% of the 
population (ESS6 2013) – still trusted more in others than before the crisis.  
 
Trust in political institutions collapsed in much the same way across different economic 
strata with the arrival of the economic crisis. However, around the time of the crisis, 
groups from different economic realities began to demonstrate trust or mistrust in 
institutions based on whether they perceived the behaviour of these institutions to be 
favourable or unfavourable to their interests. We observe this effect among 
 
unemployed people and people who depend on social assistance, who trusted less in 
parliament than others after the crisis. Self-employed workers also demonstrated 
interesting changes in trust: during the crisis, such workers lost trust in parliament and 
in the legal system much like salaried workers. Similarly, individuals living off 
investments and/or rents lost trust in the legal system and in the police during the 
crisis. Finally, the previously mentioned 6% of Spanish people satisfied with the 
economy demonstrated much greater trust in political parties than all other Spaniards. 
 
Civic participation in Spain increased four percentage points during the crisis, from 
18% in 2004 to 22% of the population in 2013 (ESS2 2005; ESS6 2013). We identify 
a positive relationship between working in a tertiary sector association and trusting in 
others, which intensified with the economic crisis. However, levels of trust in 
institutions did not differ significantly between individuals who participated in civic 
associations and those who did not, neither before nor during the crisis. We only 
observe greater levels of trust in political parties among people who worked in tertiary 
sector associations in the year 2013, although this data is only marginally significant 
and is surely explained by the links between some of these associations and the 
political parties themselves. 
 
In order to analyse the effects of trust in democracy on social trust and trust in 
institutions, we must bear in mind that the percentage of people satisfied with 
democracy in Spain dropped dramatically during the crisis. We observe the 
emergence of a critical citizenry through the fact that in 2004, two in every three 
individuals positively evaluated the country’s democracy, and in 2013 this figure was 
down to one in every four (ESS2 2005; ESS6 2013). Individuals satisfied with how 
 
Spain’s democracy was functioning – both before and during the crisis – trusted more 
in others than individuals who were not satisfied with it. For the group that continued 
to trust in how democracy was functioning despite the crisis, the crisis had the effect 
of reinforcing this relationship between trust in democracy and social trust. The same 
is true for trust in institutions: individuals who positively evaluated the functioning of 
democracy trusted more in all democratic institutions than those who were critical of 
how democracy was functioning. And, much like the case of social trust, the crisis 
reinforced this relationship among the minority that continued to trust despite the crisis.  
 
In terms of self-positioning on the political spectrum, the crisis clearly affected 
individuals placing themselves to the left of the scale, who reported greater levels of 
social trust than individuals who placed themselves in the centre or on the right. It is 
interesting to note that the positive relationship between being on the left and trusting 
others was only significant during the crisis. In the year 2004, before the crisis, it was 
not. The relationship between placing oneself to the left of the scale and trusting more 
in others could be due to the emergence of social mobilization that gradually organized 
into new left-wing political parties. The fact that the crisis also affected trust in 
institutions among individuals that placed themselves on the left, who trust less in 




This study confirms the hypothesis that, at a time of economic crisis, economic 
variables had greater influence on levels of social trust and trust in institutions. As 
posited by Delhey and Newton (2005), Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) and Nannestad 
 
(2008), this is due to the fact that trust is associated with equality of economic 
conditions and opportunities. The explanatory capacity of economic factors in 
understanding social trust and trust in institutions is enhanced mainly as a result of 
increased inequality. The data analysis conducted here indicates that increases in 
socioeconomic difficulty and inequality, stemming from the economic crisis, had a 
double effect: among social groups that suffered the worst effects of the crisis – the 
unemployed, or those in financial difficulty – trust in other individuals and in institutions 
decreased, while it increased among groups that were satisfied with the economy 
despite the crisis. Therefore, we can state that inequality increases the social distance 
between individuals as argued by Rothstein (2011) and Fairbrother and Martin (2013), 
that trust is reinforced among groups with upward social mobility, and the inverse 
(Yaojun, Savage and Warde, 2008), and, finally, that situations of socioeconomic 
difficulty, such as unemployment, are associated with a decrease in trust (Iravany and 
Dindar, 2011). 
 
One could argue that performance theory, which states that trust in institutions 
depends on the extent to which they function well, is useful in explaining decreased 
trust in political institutions among the Spanish people during the economic crisis. 
However, our statistical analysis suggests that the Spanish case reflects more closely 
the theory of Lipset and Schneider (1987), who stress that levels of trust in institutions 
primarily depend on the influence that the actions of those institutions have on people’s 
economic wellbeing. It is true that in the Spanish case, levels of trust decreased 
overall, but a detailed analysis suggests that some important interest groups – the 
unemployed, uncontracted workers, individuals dependent on social assistance, self -
employed workers, landlords, and investors – behave differently to other groups in that 
 
their trust or mistrust in institutions depends on whether they perceive those 
institutions to benefit them economically, or not. 
 
Although the capacity of economic factors to explain social trust and trust in institutions 
increases at times of economic crisis due mainly to increased inequality, the 
explanatory variables from social capital theory – levels of civic participation and 
perceptions of how democracy is functioning – continue to be important and highly 
significant, although their explanatory capacity is also influenced by the effects of the 
crisis. In that regard, our study notes that there is a significant relationship between 
civic participation and social trust, as demonstrated by well-known studies (Putnam, 
1993; Brehm and Rahn, 1997). However, the relationship between civic participation 
and trust in institutions is not significant, as suggested by the results of studies by 
Newton (1999, 2001) and Newton and Norris (2000). Our analysis also confirms the 
relationship between satisfaction with democracy and both social trust and trust in 
institutions, as posited by Zmerli and Newton (2008). Moreover, economic crisis 
reinforces this relationship. 
 
Finally, authors such as Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) argue that an 
increasingly unequal distribution of income and wealth generates a general decrease 
in trust. However, when analysing the effects of the 2008 economic crisis in the 
Spanish case at a global level, we observe a notable decrease in trust in institutions 
together with a slight increase in social trust: the two types of trust do not behave in a 
mutually supportive manner. This may be due to the effect that the economic crisis 
had in terms of increasing inequalities. Spain, of all OECD countries, experienced the 
greatest increase in inequality from the outset of the crisis: almost 10 times more than 
 
the European average. The economic crisis was particularly harsh on the poorest 
social groups, which exacerbated the two-thirds society phenomenon. The opinions of 
groups that were socially excluded and suffered the highest levels of poverty, 
inequality and marginalisation as a result of the crisis increasingly differed from others, 
and particularly from the economic and social elite. A general process of attitude 
polarisation took place, where personal economic situation played an important role. 
However, this phenomenon would be expected to drag levels of social trust down 
rather than pushing them up, suggesting that there were other factors at play. 
 
One plausible explanation of why social trust and trust in institutions were not mutually 
supportive during the economic crisis in Spain relates to the emergence of social 
movements (such as the Movimiento 15M), which gradually organized into new left-
wing political parties. The appearance of a new leftist sentiment that was more critical 
of traditional political institutions but allowed for greater trust in individuals could 
explain why social trust did not suffer to the extent that trust in institutions did during 
the crisis. Our data indicate that, during the period of the crisis, those who placed 
themselves on the left of the political spectrum changed their way of thinking. From 
that moment onwards, they demonstrated more trust in other individuals and less trust 
in institutions than groups who placed themselves in the centre or on the right of the 
political spectrum. Future research should further explore this phenomenon and 








Banco de España (2013). Boletín económico. Madrid: Banco de España. 
Brehm, John and Wendy Rahn (1997). “Individual Level Evidence for the Causes and 
Consequences of Social Capital”, American Journal of Political Science 41(3): 
999-1023. 
Buskens, Vincent (1998). “The social structure of trust”. Social Networks vol. 20(3): 
265 -289. 
Dekker, Paul and Eric M. Uslaner (eds.) (2001). Social Capital and Participation in 
Everyday Life. London: Routledge. 
Delhey, Jan and Kenneth Newton (2003). “Who trusts? The origins of social trust in 
seven societies”. European Societies 5 (2): 93 -137. 
Delhey, Jan and Kenneth Newton (2005). “Predicting cross-national levels of social 
trust: Global pattern or Nordic exceptionalism? ”European Sociological Review 
21(4): 311-327. 
Eurostat (2015). GDP per capita in PPS. Brussels: European Commission. 
Fairbrother, Malcolm and Isaac W. Martin (2013). “Does inequality erode social trust? 
Results from multilevel models of US states and countries”. Social Science 
Research 42: 347–360. 
Fukuyama, Francis (1995), The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. Nueva 
York: Free Press. 
Gambetta, Diego (ed.) (1988). Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hardin, Russell (2002). Trust and Trustworthiness. Nueva York: Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
Hearn, Frank (1997), Moral Order and Social Disorder: The American Search for Civil 
Society. Nueva York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Inglehart, Ronald (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) (2013). Encuesta de la población active (EPA). 
Madrid: INE. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) (2015). Encuesta de condiciones de vida 
(ECV). Madrid: INE. 
Intermon-Oxfam (2016). Una economía al servicio del 1%. La situación en España. 
www.oxfamintermon.org 
Iravani, Mohammad R. and Elham Dindar (2011), “The survey of factors affecting 
social trust among students: A case study of Jahrom universities' students”. 
African Journal of Business Management 5 (3). Pp.1051-1059. 
Jagodzinski, Wolfgang and Kazufumi Manabe (2004). “How to Measure Interpersonal 
Trust? A Comparison of Two Different Measures.” ZA Information 55. Pp. 85–97. 
 
Kramer, Gerald H. (1983). “The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus 
Individual-Level Findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting”. 
American Political Science Review 77. Pp. 92-111. 
Lash, Scott and John Urry (1994) The Economy of Signs and Spaces. London: Sage. 
Leighley, Jan E. (1996). “Group membership and the Mobilization of Political 
Participation”. Journal of Politics 58 (2). Pp. 447-463. 
Levi, Margaret and Laura Stoker (2000). “Political Trust and Trustworthiness.” Annual 
Review of Political Science 3. Pp. 475–508. 
Lindbeck, Assar and Dennis J. Snower (1989). "Macroeconomic Policy and Insider 
Power" American Economic Review (79). Pp. 370-376. 
Lipset, Seymour M., and William Schneider (1987). The Confidence Gap. Baltimore; 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Luhmann, Niklas (1979). Trust and Power. London: Pitman. 
Mishler, William and Richard Rose (2005). “What Are the Political Consequences of 
Trust?: A Test of Cultural and Institutional Theories in Russia.” Comparative 
Political Studies 38. Pp. 1050–78. 
Molm, Linda D., Nobuyuki Takahashi and Gretchen Peterson (2000). “Risk and trust 
in social exchange: An experimental test of a classical proposition”. American 
Journal of Sociology 105 (5). Pp. 1396-1427. 
Montero, José R., Sonja Zmerli and Ken Newton (2008): “Confianza social, confianza 
política y satisfacción con la democracia” Revista Española de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas, 122. Pp. 11-54. 
Nannestad, Peter (2008). “What have we learned about generalized trust, if anything?” 
Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 11. Pp.413-436. 
Newton, Kenneth (1999). “Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies.” In 
Pippa Norris (ed.) Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Government. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Newton, Kenneth (2001). “Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy”. 
International Political Science Review 22 (2). Pp. 201-214. 
Newton, Kenneth and Pippa Norris (2000). “Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, 
Culture, or Performance?” In Pharr S. and Putnam R. (eds.) Disaffected 
Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Norris, Pippa (ed.) (1999).  Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic 
Government. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Norris, Pippa (2011) Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
OECD (2014). Income Inequality and Poverty. Paris: OECD. 
Putnam, Robert (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy . 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Putnam, Robert (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Rosenstone, Steven J. and John M. Hansen (1993). Mobilization, Participation, and 
Democracy in America. New York: Macmillan. 
Rothstein, Bo (2011). The quality of government: corruption, social trust, and 
inequality in international perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Rothstein, Bo and Eric M. Uslaner (2005). “All for all: Equality, corruption, and social 
trust”. World Politics vol. 58 (1). Pp. 41-72. 
Sztompka, Peter (2000). Trust: A Sociological Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Uslaner, Eric M. (2002). The moral foundations of trust. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Yamagishi, Toshio (2001). “Trust as a Form of Social Inteligence” in Cook K. S., Trust 
in Society, vol 2. The Russell Sage Foundation. 
Yaojun Li, Mike Savage, and Alan Warde (2008). “Social mobility and social capital in 
contemporary Britain”. The British Journal of Sociology 59 (3). Pp. 391-411. 
Zmerli, Sonja and Ken Newton (2008). “Social trust and attitudes toward democracy”. 
Public Opinion Quarterly vol. 72. (4). Pp 706-724. 
Zmerli, Sonja and Juan C. Castillo (2015). “Income inequality, distributive fairness and 
political trust in Latin America”. Social Science Research 52. Pp. 179–192. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
